We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which may not yet be known to the antitrust authority. We identify conditions under which this apparently difficult problem has a simple resolution, in which an antitrust authority can maximize discounted expected consumer surplus by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure. We also discuss a number of extensions, as well as factors that undermine the optimality of myopic merger review policies.
Introduction
The traditional approach to the review of horizontal mergers stresses the tradeoff between market power and efficiencies. Mergers, which cause firms to internalize pricing externalities among former rivals, increase the exercise of market power, and therefore tend to reduce social welfare. On the other hand, since they can create efficiencies, horizontal mergers may instead increase welfare. This tradeoff was first articulated by Williamson [1968] for the case of an antitrust authority who wants to maximize aggregate surplus, using a diagram like Figure 1 . In the diagram, a competitive industry merges to become a monopolist that charges the price p 0 , but lowers its marginal cost of production from c to c 0 . Whether aggregate surplus increases or not depends on whether the dark-grey deadweight loss triangle exceeds the light-grey efficiency gain. A similar, though even more straightforward tradeoff arises when an antitrust authority instead applies a consumer surplus standard to merger approval decisions, as is (roughly) the case in both the U.S. and EU legal regimes. 1 In that case, the marginal cost reduction must be large enough that the price does not increase for the merger to be approved. More recently, Farrell and Shapiro [1990] (see also McAfee and Williams [1992] ) have provided a more complete and formal analysis of this tradeoff for settings with Cournot competition. Farrell and Shapiro provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a merger to increase 1 The U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, for example, state that "The Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies...likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential harm to consumers in the relevant market...." The European Commission's Merger Guidelines state that "The relevant benchmark in assessing efficiency claims is that consumers will not be worse off as a result of the merger." consumer surplus, as well as a sufficient condition for a merger to increase aggregate surplus.
With few exceptions, however, the literature on merger review has focused on the approval decision for a single merger. In reality, though, mergers are usually not one-time events. That is, one proposed merger in an industry may be followed by others. In that case, approval of a merger today based on current conditions, as in the Farrell and Shapiro test, appears inappropriate. Rather, an antitrust authority in general needs to determine the welfare effect of the current proposed merger given the potential for future merger approvals, and given the fact that today's merger approval decision may alter the set of mergers that are later proposed.
In this paper, we identify conditions under which this apparently difficult problem has a simple resolution, in which an antitrust authority who wants to maximize consumer surplus can accomplish this objective by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure. These conditions provide, we think, a useful benchmark for thinking about the dynamic merger review problem, both identifying cases in which a myopic policy is in fact optimal, and clarifying what factors can undermine the optimality of a myopic policy, necessitating a more complex consideration of dynamic trade-offs. 2 We begin in Section 2 by establishing some preliminary characterizations of consumer surplus-enhancing mergers and their interactions. Our central results focus on a model of Cournot competition with constant returns to scale. Most importantly, we show in Section 2 that there is a form of complementarity between mergers in that setting. In particular, mergers that enhance consumer surplus continue to be consumer surplus-enhancing if other mergers that enhance consumer surplus take place. Similarly, mergers that reduce consumer surplus continue to be consumer surplus-reducing if other mergers that reduce consumer surplus take place. That is, the sign of a merger's consumer surplus effect is unchanged if another merger whose consumer surplus effect has the same sign takes place. This result, which is of independent interest, sets the stage for our main result, which is contained in Section 3.
In Section 3 we imbed our Cournot competition framework into a dynamic model in which merger opportunities arise, and may be proposed, over time. We show that if the set of possible mergers is disjoint, in the sense that each firm is involved in at most one potential merger, and if mergers that are not approved in a given period are still feasible at any later date, then a completely myopic consumer surplus-based approval policy maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every possible realization of the set of feasible mergers.
In Section 4, we discuss both extensions of this result and factors that may undermine it, considering more limited information possessed by firms about each other's merger possibilities, other models of competition (homogeneous and differentiated product price competition), demand shifts, entry, continuing efficiency improvements, the presence of fixed costs and exit, merger proposal and implementation costs, merger blocking costs, the nondisjointness of mergers, and the use of an aggregate surplus criterion. Section 5 concludes. There, we note how our model naturally gives rise to the emergence of endogenous merger waves, and also discuss implications for the analysis of breakups.
Mergers in the Cournot Model

Cournot Oligopoly
Consider an industry with N firms producing a homogeneous good and competing in quantities. Let N ≡ {1, 2, ..., N } denote the set of firms. Firm i's cost of producing q i units of output is given by C i (q i ) = c i q i , where c i > 0 is firm i's marginal cost. Thus, for now, we restrict attention to firms producing under constant returns to scale. The inverse market demand is given by the twice differentiable function P (Q), where Q ≡ P i∈N q i ≥ 0 is industry output. We make the following (standard) assumption on demand.
Assumption 1 For any Q > 0 such that P (Q) > 0:
(ii) P 0 (Q) + QP 00 (Q) < 0.
Moreover, (iii) lim Q→∞ P (Q) = 0.
Part (i) of the assumption says that demand is downward-sloping, part (ii) implies that quantities are strategic substitutes and that each firm's profit maximization problem is strictly concave, and part (iii) in conjunction with c i > 0 for all i implies that the equilibrium aggregate output is bounded.
Let Q −i ≡ P j6 =i q j denote the aggregate output of all firms other than i. Firm i's bestresponse is b(Q −i |c i ) = arg max q i ≥0 [P (Q −i + q i ) − c i ]q i .
As is well known (see e.g., Farrell and Shapiro [1990] ), Assumption 1 implies that each firm's best-response function b(Q −i |c i ) satisfies ∂b(Q −i |c i )/∂Q −i ∈ (−1, 0) at all Q −i such that b(Q −i |c i ) > 0. Under Assumption 1, there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Let Q * and q * i denote, respectively, the industry output and firm i's output in equilibrium. The first-order condition for problem (1) is
so output levels in this equilibrium satisfy
and increases aggregate output and consumer surplus. Second, following any change in the incentives of a subset of firms, the equilibrium aggregate output increases if and only if the equilibrium output of that set of firms increases. 3 
The CS-Effect of Mergers
Consider a merger between a subset M ⊆ N of firms that will result in a post-merger marginal cost of c M . Denoting aggregate output before the merger by Q * , and after by Q * , the change in consumer surplus is CS(Q * ) − CS(Q * ), where
Since CS 0 (Q) = −QP 0 (Q) > 0, a merger increases consumer surplus if and only if it induces an increase in industry output. We will say that a merger is CS-neutral if the merger does not affect consumer surplus. Similarly, we will say that a merger is CS-increasing if consumer surplus following the merger is larger than before, and CS-decreasing if it is smaller. Finally, a merger is CS-nondecreasing if it is not CS-decreasing, and is CS-nonincreasing if it is not CS-increasing.
We will say that a merger involves active firms if at least one of the merging firms is producing a positive quantity before the merger [and hence has c i < P (Q * )]. Observe that a merger involving only inactive firms is always CS-nondecreasing and weakly profitable. The following result catalogs some useful properties of CS-neutral mergers involving active firms.
Lemma 1 If a merger involving active firms is CS-neutral, then
1. it causes no changes in the output of any nonmerging firm nor in the total output of the merging firms;
2. the merged firm's post-merger margin equals the sum of the active merging firms' premerger margins:
3. the merger is profitable (it weakly raises the joint profit of the merging firms), and is strictly profitable if it involves at least two active firms.
Proof. To see Property 1, observe that by (2) there is a unique output level for each nonmerging firm i that is compatible with any given level of aggregate output Q. Since aggregate output is unchanged by a CS-neutral merger, all nonmerging firms' outputs are unchanged. In turn, this implies that the total output of the merging firms must be unchanged as well. For Property 2, note that the merged firm's post-merger first-order condition [using (2) and Property 1] is
Summing up the pre-merger first-order conditions of the active merger partners yields X i∈M + {P (Q * ) − c i + q * i P 0 (Q * )} = 0 (6) where M + = {i ∈ M : q * i > 0}. Since for all i ∈ M \M + , we have P (Q * ) ≤ c i and q * i = 0, it follows that X i∈M max{0, P (Q * ) − c i } + Ã X i∈M q * i ! P 0 (Q * ) = 0.
Combining equations (5) and (7), yields (4) . Property 3 holds since the merging firms' joint output has not changed (Property 1), but its margin has weakly increased and has strictly increased if the merger involves at least two active firms (Property 2). As emphasized by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) , it follows from Property 2 of Lemma 1 that a CS-neutral merger among two or more active firms must reduce marginal cost below the marginal cost of the most efficient merger partner (c M < min i∈M {c i }). The following corollary (which follows from Properties 2 and 3 of Lemma 1 and the fact that the post-merger aggregate output, Q * , and the profit of the merged firm are both decreasing in the merged firm's marginal cost, c M ) identifies the threshold level of post-merger marginal cost that makes a merger CSnondecreasing and records that any CS-nondecreasing merger is profitable for the merging firms:
Corollary 1 A merger involving active firms is CS-neutral if
. Moreover, any CSnondecreasing merger is profitable for the merging firms, and is strictly profitable if it is CSincreasing or involves at least two active firms.
Corollary 1 implies that an antitrust authority concerned with maximizing consumer surplus and confronted with a single merger involving active firms in set M would strictly prefer to approve the merger if c M < b c M (Q * ), would be willing to if c M ≤ b c M (Q * ), and would strictly prefer to reject it if c M > b c M (Q * ). Moreover, any merger among active firms that the antitrust authority would be willing to approve is profitable for the merging parties. Observe also that the threshold b c M (Q * ) is nondecreasing in Q * and is strictly increasing in Q * if the merger involves at least two active firms. Thus, the larger is Q * (and the lower is the pre-merger price), the more likely it is that a merger is CS-nondecreasing. This fact will play a central role in our analysis, where one merger may lead to a change in industry output prior to the proposal of another merger. To see the intuition for this result, consider a proposed merger between two symmetric firms, each of whom has a pre-merger marginal cost c and produces q * > 0 units. Since the firms are choosing their outputs optimally before the merger, a lower pre-merger margin [P (Q * ) − c] due to a larger pre-merger aggregate output implies a smaller pre-merger absolute value of P 0 (Q * )q * [see (2) ]. The incentives of the merged firm to raise price, however, depend on a comparison of the merger's marginal cost reduction ∆c = (c − c M ) to the market power effect, which is exactly P 0 (Q * )q * , reflecting the internalization of the pricing externality between the merging firms. With a CS-nondecreasing merger, the first effect weakly 
exceeds the second. A larger pre-merger output Q * preserves this relation and therefore the CS-nondecreasing effect of the merger. Figure 2 illustrates the cases of CS-neutral, CS-increasing, and CS-decreasing mergers. The figure considers a merger involving two active firms, M 1 = {1, 2}, in a four-firm industry. The complementary set of firms is M 2 = {3, 4}. The axes in the figure measure the joint outputs of the two sets of firms, q M 1 and q M 2 . The curves labeled r M 1 (q M 2 ) and r M 2 (q M 1 ) depict the "pre-merger group-response functions" of each set of firms prior to the merger. Specifically, M 1 's pre-merger group-response function gives the joint pre-merger Nash-equilibrium output of the firms in M 1 , r M1 (q M2 ), conditional on the firms in M 2 producing q M2 in total,
and similarly for r M2 (q M1 ). It is routine to verify that these group-response functions satisfy
The equilibrium before the merger is point A in the figure, the intersection of the two premerger group-response curves r M 1 (q M 2 ) and r M 2 (q M 1 ); at that point, the output of groups M 1 and M 2 are q * M1 and q * M2 , respectively, and all four firms are playing best responses given their pre-merger costs. A merger M 1 that results in a post-merger marginal cost c M 1 causes the merged firm to have best-response curve b(q M 2 |c M 1 ). 4 The post-merger equilibrium lies at the intersection of this best-response curve and the group best-response curve of the firms in 
. Hence, Corollary 1 implies that merger M 1 is also CS-nondecreasing once merger M 2 has taken place.
The argument for part (ii) follows similar lines (note that a CS-decreasing merger must involve active firms, and must continue to do so after another CS-decreasing merger takes place). Figure 3 illustrates the complementarity between two mergers that are CS-increasing in isolation when no other firms exist (N c = ∅). In isolation, the CS-increasing merger M 1 moves the equilibrium from point A [the intersection of the two pre-merger group-response curves r M1 (q M2 ) and r M2 (q M1 )] to point B [the intersection of best-response curve b(q M2 |c M1 ) with pre-merger group-response curve r M2 (q M1 )], while the CS-increasing merger M 2 moves the equilibrium from point A to point C [the intersection of best-response curve b(q M1 |c M2 ) with pre-merger group-response curve r M1 (q M2 )]. But, conditional on merger M 1 taking place, merger M 2 moves the equilibrium from point B to point D [the intersection of the two best-
, aggregate output must increase with this change. Hence, conditional on merger M 1 taking place, merger M 2 remains CS-increasing. Moreover, we know from Corollary 1 that it also remains profitable. Using the same type of argument, the reverse is also true: conditional on merger M 2 taking place, the merger M 1 remains CS-increasing and profitable. When we consider the dynamic model in Section 3, we will also need to understand how mergers that have the opposite effects on consumer surplus (if implemented in isolation) in- Figure 4 : A CS-decreasing merger M 2 that becomes CS-increasing after a CS-increasing merger M 1 takes place.
teract. We now turn to this case. Suppose then that merger M 1 is CS-nondecreasing (and therefore profitable) in isolation, while merger M 2 is CS-decreasing in isolation. Figure 4 illustrates that merger M 2 can become CS-increasing conditional on merger M 1 occurring. In isolation, merger M 2 moves the equilibrium from point A to point C along the pre-merger group-response curve r M1 (q M2 ), and thus decreases industry output and consumer surplus. But after the CS-increasing merger M 1 has taken place, merger M 2 moves the equilibrium from point B to point D along best-response curve b(q M2 |c M1 ) and thus increases output and consumer surplus. Moreover, since it is CS-increasing once merger M 1 takes place, it is also profitable for the firms in M 2 . In the dynamic model we study in Section 3, this will mean that when a set of firms M 1 proposes a CS-increasing merger, the approval of that merger may cause other mergers to later be proposed and approved that would not have occurred had the first merger M 1 not been proposed. It is therefore important to understand the effect of such a chain of mergers:
Proposition 2 Suppose that merger M 1 is CS-nondecreasing in isolation, while merger M 2 is CS-decreasing in isolation but CS-nondecreasing once merger M 1 has taken place. Then:
(i) merger M 1 is CS-increasing (and therefore strictly profitable) conditional on merger M 2 taking place;
(ii) the joint profit of the firms involved in merger M 1 is strictly larger if both mergers take place than if neither merger takes place.
Proof. Consider implementing merger M 1 first followed by merger M 2 . By hypothesis, consumer surplus weakly increases after each step, so the combined effect on consumer surplus of the two mergers is nonnegative. Suppose we now reverse the order and implement merger M 2 first. Since the combined effect of the two mergers on consumer surplus is nonnegative while the effect of merger M 2 is strictly negative, consumer surplus must strictly increase when merger M 1 is implemented following merger M 2 . Hence, part (i) must hold: merger M 1 is CS-increasing (and therefore strictly profitable) conditional on merger M 2 taking place. To see that part (ii) holds, suppose that merger M 2 is implemented first. Since merger M 2 is CS-decreasing in isolation, it must weakly increase the profit of each firm i ∈ M 1 [the joint output of all firms other than i must decrease, otherwise the fact that ∂b(q i |c i )/∂Q −i ∈ (−1, 0) would imply that aggregate output increases]. Since merger M 1 is strictly profitable given merger M 2 , the sequence of mergers must strictly increase the joint profit of the firms in M 1 . Figure 4 , where merger M 1 is CS-increasing (and hence strictly profitable) in isolation and remains so conditional on merger M 2 taking place, at which point it moves the equilibrium from point C to point
Part (i) of Proposition 2 is illustrated in
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 is of some importance for our analysis in Section 3. In particular, imagine that proposal and approval of merger M 1 causes merger M 2 to become CS-increasing, and therefore be proposed and approved. Because the follow-on merger M 2 is CS-increasing, it is bad for the merged firm M 1 . Part (ii) of Proposition 2 tells us that despite this fact the firms in merger M 1 are better off proposing their merger (even though it causes merger M 2 to occur).
Remark 1
Observe that the logic of Proposition 2 can be extended to cases with a merger M 1 that is CS-nondecreasing in isolation and a collection of mergers M 2 , ..., M K that are each CS-decreasing in isolation but form a sequence that is CS-nondecreasing at each step after merger M 1 has taken place. In such cases, merger M 1 is CS-increasing (and therefore strictly profitable) given that mergers M 2 , ..., M K have taken place, and the joint profit of the firms involved in merger M 1 is strictly larger if all of these mergers take place than if none do. We will use this extension of Proposition 2 in Section 3.
CS-Maximizing Merger Review
In this section, we embed the Cournot model of Section 2 in a dynamic model where merger opportunities arise stochastically over time, merger proposals are endogenous, and the antitrust authority decides whether or not to approve proposed mergers. We consider the optimal merger approval policy for an antitrust authority concerned with maximizing discounted expected consumer surplus. We show that such an antitrust authority can achieve its optimal outcome using a myopic policy that in each period approves a set of mergers that maximizes consumer surplus given the current market structure, ignoring the possibility of any future mergers.
As before, we denote the set of N firms by N . The set of possible mergers are those in set {M 1 , ..., M K }, where M k ⊆ N is a set of firms that may merge. We assume that these possible mergers are disjoint; that is, M j ∩ M k = ∅ for j 6 = k. Thus, no firm has the possibility of being part of more than one merger. 6 The assumption of disjointness is reasonable when each firm belongs to at most a single set of "natural" merger partners who can generate significant efficiencies by merging, perhaps because they use similar or complementary technologies. If all other mergers both increase market power and fail to generate efficiencies, no other mergers but these would ever optimally be approved by the antitrust authority. 7 (We discuss the disjointness assumption further in Section 5.)
The merger process lasts for T periods. Merger M k first becomes feasible at the start of period t with probability p kt ∈ [0, 1], where P t p kt ≤ 1. Conditional on merger M k becoming feasible in period t, the firms in M k receive and observe a random draw of their post-merger cost c M k . This cost is drawn from the set C kt . One possibility allowed by this structure, of course, is that the sequence of feasible mergers and their costs is deterministic and known ex ante. However, we allow for the more realistic possibility that at any point in time neither the firms nor the antitrust authority know with certainty what mergers will be feasible in the future. 8 Indeed, the feasibility and cost levels of the various mergers may be correlated in any way within periods or over time. We denote the set of mergers that have become feasible up to and including period t (including their cost realizations) by F t .
In each period t, all firms with feasible but not-yet-approved mergers decide whether to propose them or not. Previously proposed but rejected mergers can be proposed again, as can previously unproposed feasible mergers. We denote by P t the set of mergers proposed in period t. The antitrust authority then responds by approving some subset of the proposed mergers. We denote by A t the set of mergers approved by the end of period t; that is, A t is the market structure at the end of the period after the merger review process for that period has concluded. Note that we must have A t−1 ⊆ A t ⊆ (A t−1 ∪ P t ) ⊆ F t ; the first inclusion follows because the set of approved mergers weakly grows over time, the second because only proposed mergers can be approved, and the third because only feasible mergers that have not yet been approved can be proposed. 9 We assume that when a merger M k becomes feasible in a period t, one of the firms in M k is designated as the "proposer" of the merger. To keep things simple, we treat bargaining in a reduced-form manner, assuming that the proposer chooses whether to propose the merger to the antitrust authority, and that if he chooses to do so, the firms in M k split the profit gains or losses from the merger in some fixed proportions (the proportions do not matter). 10 The antitrust authority observes that a particular merger is feasible and its efficiency (i.e., its post-merger marginal cost) once it is proposed. For simplicity, we assume that firms observe both their own and their rivals' merger possibilities, including their efficiencies, when they become feasible. (We discuss in Section 4.1 how our results extend if firms possess less information about rivals' mergers, for example observing their feasibility only once they are proposed and their efficiency only once they are approved.) 7 Because it takes a strictly positive cost reduction to offset the market power increase from a merger (recall Lemma 1), it is frequently enough to justify the disjointness assumption if other mergers cannot generate large enough cost reductions. 8 Note that our formulation embodies another form of disjointness in merger possibilities: merger M k receives at most one efficiency realization throughout the merger process. We relax this assumption in Section 4.6. 9 In the model, we do not allow previously approved mergers to be dissolved. However, it follows from our arguments that no (approved) merged firm would want to do so. 10 The only important feature of this assumption is that it implies that merger M k is proposed if it raises the joint expected discounted profit of the potential merger partners and will not be proposed if it lowers it.
Payoffs in each period t depend only on the set of mergers A t approved by the end of that period, and are determined by a complete information Cournot game, as in Section 2.
11 Each agent i, whether the antitrust authority or a proposer firm, discounts future payoffs (consumer surplus or profit) according to a discount factor δ ≤ 1. 
Myopic Merger Policies
We are interested in the performance of "myopic" merger review policies, which in each period maximize consumer surplus given the set of proposed mergers and current market structure, ignoring the possibility of future mergers. Toward this end, we start by introducing the following definitions:
Definition 1 A set of approved mergers A t ⊆ (A t−1 ∪ P t ) ⊆ F t is myopically CS-maximizing for P t given market structure A t−1 if it maximizes consumer surplus in the current period (period t) given the set of proposed mergers P t and current market structure A t−1 .
In our model with unchanging demand, maximizing current period consumer surplus is equivalent to maximizing discounted consumer surplus assuming that there will be no subsequent changes in market structure.
Definition 2 A myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is a merger approval rule that in each period t approves mergers as a function of the already-approved mergers A t−1 , the current set of proposed mergers P t , and perhaps the period t, resulting in a new market structure A * t (P t |A t−1 ) that is myopically CS-maximizing for P t given market structure A t−1 .
While we note later in Remark 2 that our main result holds for any myopically CSmaximizing merger policy, for ease of exposition we focus on the performance of the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. In this policy, the antitrust authority resolves any indifference about mergers in favor of approval, selecting in each period the largest possible set of mergers to approve among those sets that maximize consumer surplus. We call such a set a "largest myopically CS-maximizing set": Definition 3 A set of approved mergers A t ⊆ (A t−1 ∪ P t ) ⊆ F t is a largest myopically CS-maximizing set for P t given market structure A t−1 if it is not contained in any other set that is myopically CS-maximizing for P t given A t−1 .
Given the finiteness of the set of proposed mergers P t , a largest myopically CS-maximizing set must always exist. In fact, there is a unique such "largest" set for any existing market structure A t−1 and set of proposed mergers P t , which we denote by A * (P t |A t−1 ), and this set contains every other myopically CS-maximizing set for A t−1 and P t . Moreover, this set grows as the set of proposed mergers grows:
Lemma 2 For each set of proposed mergers P t and current market structure A t−1 , there is a unique largest myopically CS-maximizing set A * (P t |A t−1 ) and it contains every other myopically CS-maximizing set for A t−1 and P t . Moreover, if
Proof. In the Appendix.
The most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is the policy that approves in each period the largest myopically CS-maximizing set of mergers:
The most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is the myopically CS-maximizing merger policy that in each period t implements the largest myopically CS-maximizing set given the proposed mergers P t and current market structure A t−1 , resulting in new market structure A * (P t |A t−1 ).
Note that the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is independent of the period t, since it depends only on the payoff-relevant variables P t and A t−1 .
Importantly, the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy can also be thought of as the result of an antitrust policy that evaluates proposed mergers in an even more myopic way, making decisions on mergers within each period in a step-by-step fashion and approving a merger at each step if and only if it is CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure (including any mergers that have already been approved in that period), and continuing until no further CS-nondecreasing mergers can be identified (including mergers that may have already been examined but rejected earlier in the period). Specifically:
Lemma 3 Suppose that the antitrust authority considers mergers within period t in a step-bystep fashion, approving mergers that are CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure until no further CS-nondecreasing mergers can be identified. Then, if P t is the set of proposed mergers and A t−1 is the market structure at the start of the period, the set of approved mergers at the end of period t will be A * (P t |A t−1 ).
Proof. In the Appendix. Thus, our results will apply to any antitrust policy that considers mergers one at a time, approving each merger if it is CS-nondecreasing given the current market conditions.
Optimality of Myopic Merger Policy: Intuition and an Example
Our main result shows that the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is a dynamically optimal policy for the antitrust authority. In this section, we provide some intuition for the result and illustrate it with a simple two-period example in which there are two possible mergers. The formal statement and proof are in Section 3.3.
It is useful to think of the dynamic problem facing the antitrust authority in two parts. First, imagine that the antitrust authority had total control over which mergers are implemented: rather than firms proposing mergers, suppose that the antitrust authority is aware of all feasible mergers and has the power to implement them or not as it sees fit. In that case, in which the antitrust authority's problem is a single-agent dynamic decision problem, would a myopic policy be optimal? Two features of our model imply that it would. First, the complementarity property of CS-nondecreasing mergers derived in Proposition 1 means that if the antitrust authority implements in some period t a merger that is CS-nondecreasing at the time of approval, it will never regret that decision later: if another CS-nondecreasing merger becomes feasible later, complementarity implies that the antitrust authority will continue to want the first merger implemented as well. Second, because feasible but not-yet-approved mergers remain feasible, there is never any loss from not implementing now a merger that is currently CS-decreasing, since it can always be implemented later if circumstances change (due to other mergers becoming feasible) in a manner that makes implementing the merger good for consumer surplus.
To see these points more concretely, consider the following simple two-period example with two possible mergers:
Example 1 Suppose that in period 1 merger M 1 becomes feasible with certainty, but with an ex ante uncertain cost level c M 1 , while in period 2 merger M 2 becomes feasible with certainty with an ex ante uncertain cost level c M 2 . The industry output if no mergers occur is Q * .
Consider which mergers the antitrust authority would like to implement if it has complete control over which mergers occur. 
then Proposition 1(ii) implies that neither should be implemented, which corresponds to the region labeled "Neither." The region labeled "Both" shows those postmerger cost pairs such that implementing both mergers maximizes consumer surplus in period 2. Note that the region where both mergers should be implemented contains the region where both mergers are CS-nondecreasing in isolation [corresponding to post-mergers costs with
, reflecting the complementarity property reported in Proposition 1(i).
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Moreover, in some cases both mergers should be implemented even though one of them would be CS-decreasing in isolation because, as considered in Proposition 2, a CS-increasing merger may cause another merger that is CS-decreasing in isolation to become CS-increasing. In the remaining two regions, labeled "Only M 1 " and "Only M 2 ," approval of just one merger maximizes period-2 consumer surplus. Now consider whether merger M 1 should be implemented in period 1. If merger M 1 is CSincreasing in isolation, approval in period 1 increases period-1 consumer surplus. What effect does this have in period 2? Notice in Figure 5 that when merger
it is optimal for merger M 1 to be implemented in period 2 regardless of the cost realization of merger M 2 . Thus, in this case, merger M 1 should clearly be approved in period 1. On the other hand, if merger M 1 is CS-decreasing in isolation, approval would lower period-1 consumer surplus without creating any benefit in period 2, since it could always 13 The curve forming the boundary of the area "Both" when c M 2 < c M 2 (Q * ) is the set of cost pairs
is aggregate output when merger M 2 with postmerger cost c M 2 is implemented in isolation. The curve is downward-sloping because an decrease in c M 2 induces a larger aggregate output Q * 2 (c M 2 ) and thus a higher threshold c M 1 (Q * 2 (c M 2 )) . Similarly, the downward-sloping curve forming the boundary of the area "Both" when c be implemented in period 2 if that turns out to be desirable. So if the antitrust authority could approve any merger it wanted, it would be optimal to behave myopically in period 1, approving merger M 1 if and only if it is CS-nondecreasing in isolation.
For the second part, observe that the antitrust authority also faces an incentive problem: although it can reject mergers it does not like, it cannot compel firms to propose mergers. Rather, the antitrust authority must rely on firms to propose the mergers it wants to have implemented. However, if the antitrust authority follows the most lenient myopically CSmaximizing merger policy, it is an equilibrium for all feasible mergers to be proposed. To see the idea for why this is true, note first that if firms propose their merger and this has no effect on the other mergers that are approved, now or in the future, then the fact that it will always be CS-nondecreasing given the other approved mergers (which follows from complementarity plus the fact that the antitrust authority is following a myopically CS-maximizing policy) means that it is a profitable merger for the firms (by Corollary 1). On the other hand, if approval of their merger today causes other mergers to be approved, then by Proposition 2 (and Remark 1) it is better to have proposed their merger than not. Since every feasible merger is proposed in this equilibrium, the antitrust authority does in fact have total control over which mergers are implemented, so by the argument above the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing policy is a dynamically optimal policy. (In our formal results, we also show that when the antitrust authority follows the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in the same optimal sequence of consumer surpluses. Moreover, the optimality of this policy is very strong: even if the antitrust authority knew in advance the entire realized sequence of feasible mergers, it could not do better.)
Optimality of Myopic Merger Policy: Formal Results
Corresponding to the intuition given above, our formal argument has two parts. First, we show that if all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers are proposed in each period -so that the antitrust authority need not worry about firms' incentives to propose mergers -then the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realized sequence of feasible mergers.
Lemma 4
If all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers are proposed in each period, the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, which induces the approval sequence
for every realization of feasible mergers F = (F 1 , ..., F T ).
14 Proof. Given the realized sequence of feasible mergers F = (F 1 , ..., F T ), consider the problem of maximizing discounted consumer surplus. If we ignore the monotonicity constraint that the set of approved mergers cannot shrink over time, we can choose the approved set of mergers (i.e., the market structure) in each period independently from the mergers approved in every other period. It is evident that in that case the approval sequence {A * (F 1 |∅), ..., A * (F T |∅)} is optimal since it maximizes consumer surplus in every period. Consider now the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. We will show that this policy induces the approval sequence {A * (F 1 |∅), ..., A * (F T |∅)}, from which observation the result follows. To do so we will actually establish a slightly stronger fact, which will also be useful in the proof of Proposition 3: If the antitrust authority follows the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy in periods 1, ..., t − 1 and if all feasible but not-yetapproved mergers are proposed in period t, the market structure at the end of period t will be A * (F t |∅) regardless of the merger proposals that firms have made in periods 1, ..., t − 1.
To see this, consider an arbitrary period t and suppose that A t−1 ⊆ A * (F t−1 |∅) regardless of the history of previous merger proposals (which is true if t = 1). If all feasible but not-yetapproved mergers are proposed in period t, then A t = A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ). We will show that
Observe that the problem of myopically maximizing consumer surplus given previously approved mergers A t−1 and proposed mergers F t \A t−1 is a more constrained problem than is the problem of myopically maximizing consumer surplus given no previously approved mergers and proposed mergers F t . However, since
(the first inclusion follows by hypothesis and the second by Lemma 2), the largest solution to this latter, less constrained problem is feasible in the former, more constrained 14 We denote by A = ∅ the market structure in which no mergers have yet been approved.
problem. It must therefore also be the largest solution in the more constrained problem. 15 Hence, A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) = A * (F t |∅), which implies that, if all mergers are proposed in period t, the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing policy induces the set A t = A * (F t |∅) in period t. Note also that since P t ⊆ F t , the monotonicity of the largest myopically CS-maximizing set A * (P t |A t−1 ) in P t , established in Lemma 2, implies that A t ⊆ A * (F t |∅), regardless of the merger proposals made up through and including period t. Thus, our induction hypothesis holds when we look at period t + 1. Applying induction, yields the result. The second part of the argument concerns firms' incentives to propose mergers. To establish our main result, we show that when the antitrust authority adopts the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy the firms' proposal incentives are aligned with the desires of the antitrust authority. More specifically, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the firms in which every feasible merger is proposed in every period. Moreover, all subgame perfect Nash equilibria result in the same (optimal) sequence of period-by-period consumer surpluses.
Proposition 3 Suppose the antitrust authority follows the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. Then:
(i) All feasible mergers being proposed in each period after any history is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the firms. In this equilibrium, the outcome maximizes discounted consumer surplus for any realized sequence of feasible mergers F = (F 1 , ..., F T ).
(ii) For each sequence F, every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in the same optimal sequence of period-by-period consumer surpluses.
Proof. (i) The proof of the first claim is by induction. Consider a period t and suppose that starting in period t + 1 the joint expected continuation payoff of the firms in each possible feasible merger is independent of firms' prior behavior. (Note that this is true in period T since there are no payoffs after period T .) We will establish that regardless of the previous history or rivals' proposal strategies in period t, it is optimal in period t for every proposer firm with a feasible but-not-yet approved merger to propose it. 16 To see this, consider a firm that is the proposer of a feasible but not-yet-approved merger M k . Note that since continuation payoffs are (by hypothesis) unaffected by period t play, it 15 More generally, suppose that At is myopically CS-maximizing for Pt given A t−1 , and that A 0 t is myopically CS-maximizing for P 0 t given
, then the level of consumer surplus under A 0 t must be at least as great as under A t (more mergers that can be approved and fewer mergers already approved makes the primed problem less constrained than the unprimed one). Hence, if A 0 t is feasible for Pt given
t must also be myopically CS-maximizing for P t given A t−1 and the level of consumer surplus attained in the two problems must be the same. A t is therefore also myopically CS-maximizing for P 0 t given A 0 t−1 , from which it follows (by Lemma 2) that A t ⊆ A * (P 0 t |A 0 t−1 ). Two conclusions follow from applying this logic, the first of which is the point made here in the text, and the second of which is of relevance in the proof of Proposition 3:
, then the largest myopically CS-maximizing sets in the two problems are the same, i.e., A
] is myopically CS-maximizing for P 0 t given A 0 t−1 , then it is the largest myopically CS-maximizing set for Pt given A t−1 , i.e., A
[this follows because any myopically CS-maximizing set A t for P t given A t−1 then satisfies both A t ⊆ A * (P 0 t |A 0 t−1 ) and A t ⊆ (P t ∪ A t−1 )] . 16 The history prior to period t's proposal stage consists of the sequences F t = (F 1 , ..., Ft) of feasible mergers,
.., P t−1 ) of proposed mergers, and A t−1 = (A 1 , ..., A t−1 ) of approved mergers. This history, which is observed by all firms, determines a subgame that starts in period t.
is optimal to propose the merger if proposing it maximizes the joint expected period t payoff of the firms in M k . Let b P denote a realization of the set of proposed mergers in period t if merger M k is proposed (firms in other feasible but not-yet-approved mergers may be using mixed strategies) and let b P −k ≡ b P\M k denote that realization without merger M k included. Suppose, first, that b P −k is such that merger M k is not approved when proposed. Then the set of approved mergers, and hence the joint period-t expected payoff of the firms in M k , is unaffected by whether merger M k is proposed. 17 The joint period-t expected payoff of the firms in M k is also unaffected by whether merger M k is proposed if instead b P −k is such that merger M k is approved when proposed, but the merged firm M k is inactive (produces zero output) in period t after its merger is approved. In that case, merger M k is CS-neutral given the other mergers that are approved, which implies that A * ( b P|A t−1 )\M k is a myopically CS-maximizing set for b P given A t−1 . The set A * ( b P|A t−1 )\M k is also feasible when merger M k is not proposed, which implies that it is the largest myopically CS-maximizing set for b P −k given A t−1 . 18 So proposal of merger M k does not affect which other mergers are approved in period t. As a result, proposal of merger M k has no effect on the joint period-t profits of the firms in M k , which are zero in either case. Finally, suppose that b P −k is such that merger M k is approved when proposed and that the merged firm M k is active in period t after its merger is approved. We distinguish between two cases. First, suppose that A
In this case, proposing merger M k does not affect the other mergers that will be approved. Since M k ∈ A * ( b P|A t−1 ), the merger is CS-nondecreasing given the other mergers that will be approved, and is therefore [by Corollary 1] strictly profitable to propose. The other possibility (by Lemma 2) is that
of Lemma 6 in the Appendix implies that there is a sequencing of the mergers in
that is CS-nondecreasing at each step. However, since all of the mergers in this set other than M k must be CS-decreasing given that the mergers in A * ( b P −k |A t−1 ) have taken place [otherwise they would have been in
, merger M k must be CS-nondecreasing given that the mergers in A * ( b P −k |A t−1 ) have occurred and must be the first merger in this sequence. By Remark 1, the firms in M k have a strictly greater profit when all of the mergers in
are approved than when none are. Hence, it is strictly more profitable in this case as well to propose merger M k .
In summary, it is an optimal strategy for every feasible but not-yet-approved merger M k to be proposed in period t regardless of the previous history and rivals' period-t proposal strategies. The set of approved mergers at the end of period t will therefore be A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ). By the argument in the proof of Lemma 4, we know that A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) = A * (F t |∅) for any A t−1 that can arise under the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. Thus, the market structure (and joint expected payoffs of the firms in each possible merger) at the end of period t is independent of firms' behavior prior to period t. Our induction hypothesis therefore holds when we look at period t − 1. Applying induction starting in period T implies that in every period proposing every feasible but not-yet-approved merger is optimal. 17 This follows formally from conclusion (i) in footnote 15 since P −k ⊆ P and
. This follows from conclusion (ii) in footnote 15 since
(ii) To establish the second claim, we first define two sets that form a partition of A * (P t |A t−1 ).
Let A * 0 (P t |A t−1 ) denote those mergers in P t ∩ A * (P t |A t−1 ) that result in merged firms that are inactive given the other mergers in A * (P t |A t−1 ) and let
denote the complementary set. Note that approval of inactive mergers has no effect on either consumer surplus or firms' payoffs. This implies that if all mergers in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 are proposed -i.e., if A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) ⊆ (P t ∪ A t−1 ) -then consumer surplus and all firms' payoffs will be the same in period t as if all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers were proposed.
We now show that when the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers in period t is F t \A t−1 , every merger in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 will be proposed. The proof is by induction. The induction hypothesis for period t is that in all future periods τ > t, whenever the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers is
is CSnondecreasing given every other merger in that set. Since A t−1 ⊆ A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ), Lemma 6(i) (in the Appendix) implies that, starting from A t−1 , there is an ordering of the mergers in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 that is CS-nondecreasing at each step, which we denote by (M 1 , ..., M S ). Suppose that all mergers M s for s < k are proposed when F t \A t−1 is the set of feasible and not-yet-approved mergers in period t. (Note that this assumption is valid when
; that is, all of these mergers, including merger M k , will be approved. 19 If
, so merger M k is still approved. Since merger M k is certain to be approved if proposed, and results in an active firm, our argument in part (i) implies that proposal of the merger M k is strictly profitable. Applying induction starting at k = 1, we see that if F t \A t−1 is the set of feasible and not-yet-approved mergers, all mergers in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 will be proposed. Applying induction starting in period T, we conclude that in every period t if the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers in period t is F t \A t−1 , then every merger in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 will be proposed in that period. The result follows.
Proposition 3 shows that a myopic merger policy that in each period approves the largest set of mergers that maximizes current consumer surplus (or, equivalently, maximizes discounted consumer surplus ignoring the possibility of any further changes in market structure) is dynamically optimal for the antitrust authority in that it maximizes discounted expected consumer surplus. Indeed, the proposition establishes an even stronger result: the antitrust authority could not do better even if it knew at the start of the process what the entire sequence of feasible mergers (F 1 , ..., F T ) would be and could implement feasible but unproposed mergers. 20 19 In particular, by Lemma 6(ii), every merger in set {M 1 , ..., M k } is CS-nondecreasing given every other merger in the set. By Lemma 6(i), if a strict subset of {M 1 , ..., M k } were approved, there would be a proposed but unapproved merger that could be approved without lowering consumer surplus. So all mergers in {M 1 , ..., M k } will be approved in the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. 20 Moreover, the fact that the largest myopically CS-maximizing set monotonically increases over time implies that the antitrust authority also could not do better if it could undo previously approved mergers, which we
In addition, by Lemma 3, the result implies that an even more myopic policy in which the antitrust authority considers mergers individually in a sequential fashion, myopically approving each merger if it is CS-nondecreasing given the market structure at the time of its review, is also dynamically optimal in this very strong sense.
Finally, we make the following observation:
Remark 2 While for ease of exposition we have restricted attention to the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, dynamic optimality holds for any myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. See the Appendix for a discussion.
Robustness
In this section, we discuss a number of extensions to, and limitations of, our main results.
Information of Firms
In our analysis, we have assumed that firms observe both their own and their rivals' merger possibilities, including their efficiencies, as soon as these become feasible. We now show that the conclusion of Proposition 3 carries over to the case where firms observe the feasibility of other mergers only when they are proposed, and observe the efficiency gains of other mergers only when those mergers are approved. (We continue to assume that firms observe their own merger possibility when it becomes feasible. We also continue to assume that each firm knows the initial costs of all firms at the start of period 1, so that complete-information Cournot competition in each period is justified.) To establish the result, we use the solution concept of extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium.
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Proposition 4 Assume firms observe the feasibility of other mergers only when they are proposed and the efficiency gains of other mergers only when they are approved, and that C kt is a finite set for all k and t. Suppose the antitrust authority follows the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. Then:
(i) All feasible mergers being proposed in each period after any history is an extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium for the firms. In this equilibrium, the outcome maximizes discounted consumer surplus for any realized sequence of feasible mergers
(ii) For each sequence F, every extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium results in the same optimal sequence of period-by-period consumer surpluses.
have assumed is not possible. 21 We use this solution concept rather than the weaker notion of sequential equilibrium to establish part (ii) of the result. The trembles ensure that following any history, when the true set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers is F t \A t−1 , every proposer firm assigns a strictly positive probability to this set being the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers.
Price competition
So far, we have assumed that firms compete in quantities. In this subsection, we discuss the case where firms compete in prices rather than quantities. We show that our basic conclusion continues to hold, albeit in a somewhat weaker form. Specifically, part (i) of Proposition 3 extends to the case of price competition, while part (ii) of that proposition does not. That is, under the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy there is an equilibrium that maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realized sequence of feasible mergers, but there may also be other equilibria that do not.
To
(If a subset of firms have the same marginal cost, then the firms in this subset are ordered arbitrarily.) Assuming that Q(c ι(1|N ) ) > 0 and Assumption 1 holds, and restricting attention to the standard Bertrand pricing equilibrium 22 ,
where the nondecreasing function p m (c) ≡ arg max p (p − c)Q(p) is the monopoly price of a firm with marginal cost c. In equilibrium, all consumers purchase at price p ι(1|N ) , and so consumer surplus is given by
Q(p)dp.
Note that CS(p 1 , p 2 , ..., p N ) is independent of p ι(i|N ) for i > 1, and nonincreasing in p ι(1|N ) . One important difference between the Cournot and Bertrand models is that with Bertrand competition a merger that is CS-neutral in isolation can become CS-decreasing when another merger takes place that is CS-increasing in isolation, as the following example demonstrates: and make all the sales in the market. The cost-increasing merger M 1 is then CS-neutral in isolation since the post-merger price will still be 10. Merger M 2 is CS-increasing in isolation because it reduces firm 1's price from 10 to 8. However, once merger M 2 occurs, merger M 1 is CS-decreasing since it raises the price from 8 to 9.
This problem can be traced to the fact that a merger involving the lowest-cost firm ι(1|N ) that increases cost can be CS-neutral in the Bertrand model. We will say that a merger of the firms in set M is cost increasing if the post-merger marginal cost of the merged entity, c M , is above the marginal cost of the most efficient merger partner, i.e., c M > min i∈M c i . Intuitively, an antitrust authority can without loss reject any cost-increasing merger, since any such merger both worsens efficiency and the extent of market power. 23 We shall henceforth focus on an antitrust authority that never approves cost-increasing mergers. Formally, this is equivalent to supposing that feasible mergers are never cost increasing, an assumption that will allow us to fit the analysis into the same framework as the Cournot model.
The following result records some properties of mergers that do not increase cost:
Lemma 5 Consider a merger that does not increase cost among a subset M of firms in a Bertrand market.
1. It is profitable (it weakly increases the joint profit of the firms in M ).
2. The merger is CS-decreasing only if it involves all of the firms with cost c ι (1|N ) , all of the firms with cost c ι(2|N ) , and moreover
Proof. In the Appendix. Another important difference from the Cournot model is that a merger that is CS-increasing may not be strictly profitable: for example, a cost-reducing merger of firms ι(2|N ) and ι(3|N ) that results in a cost above c ι(1|N ) lowers the market price but leaves firms ι(2|N ) and ι(3|N ) with zero profit after the merger. For this reason, part (ii) of Proposition 3 will not hold in the Bertrand model [e.g., firms ι(2|N ) and ι(3|N ) in this example can optimally decide not to propose their merger even if it is CS-increasing].
Nevertheless, part (i) of Proposition 3 does hold: all feasible mergers being proposed in each period after any history is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the firms, and the equilibrium outcome maximizes discounted consumer surplus for any realized sequence of feasible mergers F. To see this, we first consider the interaction between two disjoint mergers, M 1 and M 2 . Let N denote the set of firms if neither merger takes place, N i the set of firms after merger M i (but not M j , j 6 = i) has taken place, and N 12 the set of firms after both mergers have taken place. The key fact is that in the Bertrand model, versions of Propositions 1 and 2 that are sufficient to establish part (i) of Proposition 3 continue to hold for mergers that do not increase cost:
Proposition 5 In the Bertrand model:
(i) if a merger that does not increase cost is CS-nondecreasing in isolation, it remains CSnondecreasing if another merger that does not increase cost and is CS-nondecreasing in isolation takes place.
(ii) there cannot be two distinct mergers that do not increase cost and are CS-decreasing in isolation.
Proposition 6 Consider two mergers M 1 and M 2 that are not cost increasing. Suppose that merger M 1 is CS-nondecreasing in isolation, while merger M 2 is CS-decreasing in isolation but CS-nondecreasing once merger M 1 has taken place. Then:
(i) Merger M 1 is CS-increasing conditional on merger M 2 taking place;
(ii) The joint profit of the firms involved in merger M 1 is weakly larger if both mergers take place than if neither merger takes place.
Proof. In the Appendix. Proposition 6 differs from Proposition 2 for the Cournot model only in that the profitability conclusions are weak rather than strict. Given Propositions 5 and 6, the basic arguments leading to part (i) of Proposition 3 (now for mergers that do not increase cost) parallel those for the Cournot model.
Differentiated Products
The Cournot and Bertrand analyses so far assumed a homogeneous product market. Unfortunately, extending our main results to the case of differentiated products, and hence to multiproduct firms, is not straightforward. For example, think of the extreme case in which there are two differentiated products in the market. A merger might leave overall consumer surplus unchanged while raising one price and lowering the other. Since in the extreme case in which the two products are independent in demand there are two independent homogeneous goods markets, we are not able to extend our arguments about the complementarity of CS-nondecreasing mergers. On the other hand, our main results do extend to the case of differentiated products if "strong symmetry" is imposed on both demand and costs (in the sense that all firms that are involved in the same merger have identical marginal costs for all of their products, both pre-merger and post-merger). In that case, price effects for all goods move in the same direction and the complementarity results from our previous analyses carry over, as we now discuss. In our discussion, we will focus on the case of price competition with differentiated products.
Let Q j (p N ) denote the demand for product j, where p N is the vector of prices, and suppose that the demand system is symmetric across products. Moreover, assume that demand is downward-sloping and strictly log-concave in own price, products are demand substitutes, prices are strategic complements, and the own-price effect dominates the cross-price effects in terms of both the level of demand and its slope.
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For simplicity, suppose that, prior to merging, all firms produce a single product so that firm j ∈ N produces product j ∈ N . After merging, the firms in the set M k produce all of the products in M k . We assume that, prior to merging, each firm j ∈ M k faces the same marginal cost c j = c M k while after the merger all products in M k are produced at the same marginal cost c M k . This assumption ensures that any equilibrium has the property that the price of every product in the set M k is always the same: Kühn and Rimler [2006] ). In particular, this means that we can think of each firm's strategic variable being one-dimensional, so the standard analysis of differentiated goods price competition with single-product firms (see Vives [1999] ) extends to our setting with multiproduct firms.
Consider a merger amongst active firms in set M k , and let p * N denote the vector of premerger equilibrium prices. Since prices are strategic complements, the merger is CS-neutral if 24 The own effect of price change dominates the cross effects in terms of the level of demand if j∈N (∂Q i (p N )/∂p j ) < 0 and in terms of the slope of demand if Kühn and Rimler [2006] . and only if it leaves all prices unchanged, so the threshold value of post-merger marginal cost that makes this merger CS-neutral is given by
where
The term Ψ i is familiar from merger analysis: it is the "diversion ratio" from product i ∈ M k to other products in M k , defined as the share of the lost sales of product i ∈ M k that are captured by the other products in M k after an increase in the price of product i. Since (by assumption) ∂Q i (p * N )/∂p i < 0 and ∂Q j (p N )/∂p i > 0 for j 6 = i, and (from the first-order condition of profit-maximization) P
That is, for the merger to be CS-neutral, the merger must be cost-reducing, and therefore profitable for the merging parties. Strategic complementarity implies that a decrease in post-merger marginal cost c M k induces all prices to fall. Consequently, a merger amongst active firms in M k is CS-increasing if and only if c
and CS-decreasing if and only if
While every CS-neutral merger is profitable, it is not straightforward to show that every CSnondecreasing merger is profitable. The complication arises because a reduction in marginal cost c M k has two opposing effects on the profits of the merged firm M k : holding fixed the prices of all other firms, the direct effect of a decrease in c M k is to increase the merged firm's profit; but the strategic effect of a decrease in c M k is to reduce the merged firm's profit as all other firms will decrease their prices in response. One therefore needs to impose conditions on demand to ensure that the direct effect outweighs the strategic effect and a decrease in its marginal cost raises that firm's equilibrium profit. It is straightforward to check that this is indeed the case, for example, when demand is linear,
Let us now turn to the interaction between mergers. Our previous result on the complementarity of those mergers that change consumer surplus in the same direction (Proposition 2) carries over to the present setting if approving a CS-increasing merger M l raises the threshold b c M k for merger M k , k 6 = l (and approving a CS-decreasing M l reduces b c M k ). Since a CS-increasing merger reduces all prices, this means that our complementarity result extends if demand is such that b c M k (p * N ) is weakly decreasing in all prices. In the case of linear demand, for example, the diversion ratio Ψ i is a constant, so b c M k (p * N ) depends only on, and is strictly decreasing in, p * M k
. It follows that complementarity holds. More generally, a sufficient condition for b c M k (p * N ) to be nonincreasing in the prices of all products with positive sales is that the diversion ratio Ψ i is nondecreasing in all prices. Provided that this complementarity holds, Proposition 3 extends to this setting.
Demand Shifts
While our model had a stationary demand function, Corollary 1 suggests that our main results hold provided that demand is weakly declining over time. Specifically, suppose that inverse demand in period t can be written as P (Q; θ t ), where θ t is the publicly observable demand state realized at the beginning of period t (before mergers are proposed), which we assume is decreasing over time, i.e., θ t ≤ θ t−1 . For any tuple (Q; θ t ) such that P (Q; θ t ) > 0, we continue to assume that P Q < 0 and P Q + QP QQ < 0 (where subscripts denote partial derivatives); moreover, we now assume that P θ > 0 and P Qθ ≤ 0. For example, these conditions hold if inverse demand takes the form P (Q; θ t ) ≡ θ t P (Q) and P (Q) satisfies the conditions of Assumption 1.
Let Q * (A t ; θ t ) denote the equilibrium industry output when market structure is A t and the demand state is θ t . Since inverse demand is changing over time, it is more convenient to write b c M (the post-merger marginal cost threshold that makes a merger amongst active firms in set M CS-neutral) as a function of equilibrium price rather than industry quantity:
where P * (A t ; θ t ) ≡ P (Q * (A t ; θ t ); θ t ). Our assumptions on demand ensure that, holding fixed market structure A t , a decrease in the demand state θ t will lead to a decrease in the equilibrium price P * (A t ; θ t ). 25 This, in turn, implies that, holding fixed market structure A t , the postmerger marginal cost threshold b c M (P * (A t ; θ t )) weakly increases over time (as long as the merger involves active firms). As before, the threshold strictly increases as P * (A t ; θ t ) decreases due to CS-increasing mergers in the rest of the industry. Hence, if the antitrust authority adopts a myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, then if merger M is CS-nondecreasing in period t, it will remain CS-nondecreasing in every future period t 0 > t. (By contrast, a merger M that is CS-decreasing in period t may now become CS-nondecreasing in some later period t 0 > t even holding market structure fixed.) The largest myopically CS-maximizing set of mergers now depends not only on the set of proposed mergers P t and current market structure A t−1 , but also on the demand state θ t , and is denoted A * (P t ; θ t |A t−1 ). As the discussion above makes clear,
Hence, if all feasible but notyet-approved mergers are always proposed, then the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realized sequence of feasible mergers F (Lemma 4). Moreover, as before, if the antitrust authority adopts the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, the resulting equilibrium outcome is dynamically optimal (Proposition 3). 25 Summing up the first-order conditions of profit maximization and applying the implicit function theorem,
where Q * is industry output and N is the number of active firms when the market structure is At and the demand state is θ t . Under our assumptions on demand, the expression on the right-hand side is strictly positive.
Entry
In our analysis above, we assumed that the set of firms is fixed, except for mergers. Would our conclusions change if we allowed for firm entry? Recall that our model implies that the equilibrium price P (Q * ) falls weakly over time. This suggests that if a firm does not find it profitable to enter the market at the beginning of the first period, before any mergers have become feasible, then this firm will not find it profitable to enter the market in any later period (provided that its costs have not changed). That is, allowing for free entry of firms (with unchanging costs) does not affect our results. Moreover, suppose that new firms periodically enter the market later, for example after discovering how to make the product. (In our model, such an entry event is equivalent to a sufficient reduction in the marginal cost of a hitherto inactive firm.) These (potentially stochastic) entry events lower the market price, and leave our main result unchanged for reasons that parallel those in our discussion above of demand shifts.
Continuing Efficiency Improvements
In the analysis above, we assumed that when a merger, say M k , becomes feasible, the firms in M k receive a (random) draw of their post-merger marginal cost c M k once and for all; if merger M k is implemented, the marginal cost of the merged entity is c M k forever after. But it seems plausible that, over time, firms involved in a (potential) merger may have more than one idea of how to create synergies amongst them, both pre-merger and post-merger. As we now discuss, it is possible to extend our analysis to allow for continuing efficiency improvements.
Consider the following generalization of our previous setup: as before, we assume that if merger M k becomes feasible at the beginning of period t, then the firms in M k receive a random draw of their post-merger marginal cost. Moreover, we now assume that the postmerger marginal cost c M k follows a (discrete-time) stochastic process from period t onward. The stochastic process governing these additional cost draws is independent of whether the firms in M k have already merged or not. Crucially, we assume that the post-merger marginal cost c M k weakly decreases over time.
Our previous results carry over to this generalized setting. The arguments closely parallel those in our discussion above of demand shifts. Since a reduction in merged firm M k 's marginal cost reduces the equilibrium price (and thereby reduces the post-merger marginal cost threshold b c M l of every other merger M l , l 6 = k), the largest myopically CS-maximizing set of mergers will weakly increase over time if the antitrust authority adopts the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. Hence, if all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers are always proposed, then the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realized sequence of feasible mergers F (Lemma 4). Moreover, the induction argument in the proof of Proposition 3 continues to apply, showing that the resulting equilibrium outcome is dynamically optimal.
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Our previous results do not carry over, however, if the efficiency improvements depend 26 In our discussion, we have assumed that a merged firm's post-merger marginal cost follows an exogenous stochastic process that is weakly decreasing over time. It is straightforward to show that if the merged firm has to make an active decision as to whether or not to implement a cost-reducing innovation, then it is indeed profitable for the merged firm to implement it. on merger approvals. For example, suppose that approval of merger M 1 in period t induces a deterministic reduction in post-merger marginal cost in period t + t 1 > t, from c 0 M1 to c 00 M1 < c 0 M1 . Suppose also that approval of M 1 in period t would reduce discounted consumer surplus but raise consumer surplus from period t+t 1 onward. Further, assume that merger M 2 , which becomes feasible after merger M 1 , is slightly CS-decreasing in isolation but CS-increasing once M 1 with the low cost c 00 M 1 is implemented. In this situation, discounted consumer surplus may be maximized by approving M 1 exactly t 1 periods before merger M 2 even though each merger is CS-decreasing in isolation.
Fixed Costs and Exit
So far, we have assumed that all fixed costs are sunk, and that mergers had no effect on these costs. Our Cournot results extend to cases in which fixed costs are present and possibly affected by mergers provided that (i) mergers that are CS-nondecreasing in isolation continue to be profitable in isolation and (ii) mergers do not cause active firms to shut down.
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Regarding (i), recall from Corollary 1 that, in the absence of fixed costs, every CS-nondecreasing merger is profitable in isolation. This result continues to hold in the presence of fixed costs, provided that the post-merger fixed cost of a merged firm is not larger than the sum of the pre-merger fixed costs of the merger partners. In particular, our result is unaffected if mergers generate efficiencies in fixed costs as well as marginal costs.
If (ii) is violated, Proposition 1 need not hold. For example, suppose both mergers M 1 and M 2 are CS-increasing in isolation and do not induce any firm to exit. However, if both mergers are approved, then some other firm j ∈ N \(M 1 ∪ M 2 ) might find it optimal to exit. (This outcome is possible since, without exit, the market price after both mergers would be lower than after only one merger.) Taking the endogenous exit of firm j into account, consumer surplus after both mergers might therefore be lower than after merger M 1 only, in which case merger M 2 would be CS-decreasing conditional on merger M 1 . Thus, Proposition 1(i) may fail to hold. In a similar vein, Motta and Vasconcelos [2005] allow for exit in a setting with four symmetric firms and two possible disjoint cost-reducing mergers involving two firms each. Each merger is CS-decreasing in isolation because it induces the other two, non-merging firms to exit. But consumer surplus increases if both mergers are approved, implying that each merger becomes CS-increasing once the other merger has taken place. Thus, Proposition 1(ii) fails to hold in their model. As a result, a myopic policy need not be optimal.
While these observations suggest that in general our main results could break down in the presence of fixed costs and endogenous exit, we can allow for exit among a competitive fringe of price-taking firms that do not take part in any mergers. To do so, we construct the competitive fringe's (long-run) supply function, S F (p), which takes potential exit (and entry) of these firms into account. The residual demand of the large, strategic firms in set N is then given by
, where D(p) is market demand. As long as the inverse residual market demand function P (·) ≡ R −1 (·) satisfies the conditions of Assumption 1, our analysis and conclusions remain unchanged. 27 In the Bertrand model, all but one firm will exit if there are positive levels of fixed costs.
Merger Proposal and Implementation Costs
In our analysis, we have assumed that there are no costs of proposing a merger to the antitrust authority. Moreover, we have highlighted a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which all feasible mergers are always proposed, including some that have no chance of being approved. One might be concerned that firms would not propose such mergers if they had even the tiniest cost of making a merger proposal. However, since every CS-nondecreasing merger is strictly profitable (provided it results in an active firm), there is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which, in every period and after any history, the mergers proposed are those that will be approved in equilibrium (i.e., the mergers that are in the largest myopically CS-maximizing set of mergers, given the current market structure) and result in an active firm. Since all of these mergers are strictly profitable, our conclusion -that, if the antitrust authority adopts the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, then every subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realized F -would not change in the presence of merger proposal costs, provided these are sufficiently small. For the same reason, our main results would continue to hold if the merged firm had to incur a fixed cost of implementing an approved merger, provided this cost is small enough. Furthermore, even if the costs of proposing and implementing a merger are not small, these costs may be swamped by possible merged-induced fixed cost savings (cf., our discussion above of the effects of fixed costs). If, however, the costs of proposing or implementing a merger are not small and not swamped by fixed cost synergies, then firms may have insufficient incentives to propose their merger even if this merger is CS-increasing. In the following discussion we focus on large fixed costs of implementing a merger, ignoring merger proposal costs, but the reader should keep in mind that the issues arising from large proposal costs are very similar.
First, note that the problem of misalignment of proposal incentives between the potential merger partners and the antitrust authority arises trivially even in the case of a single isolated merger: a merger that is CS-nondecreasing in isolation may not be profitable if the fixed cost of implementing the merger is large. Second, Propositions 1 and 2 may no longer hold. For instance, a CS-nondecreasing merger can reduce the absolute profitability of another CSnondecreasing merger while still leaving it CS-nondecreasing and hence profitable gross of merger implementation costs. To see that this violation of Proposition 1 may indeed arise, we note the following corollary of Propositions 1 and 2:
Corollary 2 (i) Suppose merger M 1 , involving at least two active firms, is CS-neutral in isolation and merger M 2 is CS-increasing in isolation. Then, approving M 1 increases the positive effect of M 2 on consumer surplus but reduces the profitability of M 2 . (ii) Suppose merger M 1 , involving at least two active firms, is CS-neutral in isolation and merger M 2 is CSdecreasing in isolation. Then, approving M 1 increases the negative effect of M 2 on consumer surplus but improves the profitability of M 2 .
Proof. (i) From the proof of Proposition 1, M 1 is CS-increasing conditional on M 2 being approved, despite being CS-neutral in isolation. Hence, approving M 1 increases the positive effect of M 2 on consumer surplus. Now, since M 1 is CS-neutral in isolation but CS-increasing once M 2 has been approved, approval of M 1 does not affect the joint pre-merger profit of the firms in M 2 but reduces the profit of the merged M 2 . The proof of (ii) proceeds along the same lines.
Note that, by continuity, both parts of the corollary continue to hold if the consumer surplus effect of M 1 in isolation is either positive or negative, but sufficiently close to zero. The corollary implies, in particular that the following situation may arise: Both merger M 1 and merger M 2 are CS-increasing and profitable in isolation net of implementation costs, but unprofitable once the other merger takes place. The antitrust authority may therefore want to approve only one merger, namely the one with the greater effect on consumer surplus in isolation, say M 2 . If M 1 is proposed first, a myopic policy is not optimal.
Merger Blocking Costs
In our analysis, we have assumed that the antitrust authority's merger review process is frictionless. Suppose now instead that the antitrust authority has to incur a fixed cost of b > 0 whenever it blocks a merger. Further, suppose that the antitrust authority seeks to maximize discounted expected consumer surplus minus blocking costs. It turns out that the existence of these merger blocking costs implies that the optimal merger approval policy is no longer time-consistent. In the following discussion we therefore distinguish between two cases: no commitment and full commitment.
Consider first the case where the antitrust authority can ex ante commit to its future policy. In particular, suppose the antitrust authority commits to following the myopically CSmaximizing merger policy analyzed in Section 3, thereby ignoring any blocking costs. Then, assuming (as in Section 3) that firms observe not only their own but also rivals' merger possibilities (including their efficiencies) whenever they become feasible, there exists a dynamically optimal equilibrium in which the discounted expected consumer surplus minus blocking costs is maximized for any realized sequence of feasible mergers. To see this, note that in the game without blocking costs (as analyzed in Section 3) there always exists an equilibrium where, in each period, firms propose only those mergers that the antitrust authority approves in that period (i.e., the set of proposed mergers is a myopically CS-maximizing set, given the current market structure). So, along this equilibrium path, mergers are not blocked, implying that the equilibrium is immune to the introduction of blocking costs. In fact, if firms have to incur a sufficiently small but positive cost whenever they propose a merger, then this is the unique equilibrium (cf., our above discussion of merger proposal costs).
Consider now the case where the antitrust authority cannot commit to its future policy but, instead, in each period decides what set of proposed mergers to approve. It is clear that the policy outlined in Section 3 will not generally be dynamically consistent because the antitrust authority may want to approve a CS-decreasing merger if its consumer surplus reduction is less than the cost of blocking it. More generally, the antitrust authority's optimal policy (now a best response to firms' proposal strategies) may not be myopic, in the sense that a forward-looking authority may optimally consider the possibility of future mergers in making its approval decision.
As an example, suppose that there are two potential mergers, M 1 and M 2 , each one of which is CS-decreasing in isolation, but the drop in consumer surplus induced by each merger is smaller than the blocking cost b (implying that neither merger should be blocked if it is the only possible merger). Given Corollary 2, it may well be, however, that the antitrust authority wants to allow one merger but not both, since approving one merger may make the other merger worse for consumers.Thus, absent commitment, merger blocking costs provide one possible explanation for the often-heard argument among antitrust commentators and practitioners that "we can allow one but not both of these mergers," a sentiment that in light of Proposition 1 makes little sense in the model of Sections 2 and 3. However, whenever approving "one but not both" is best, a myopic policy will not be optimal: e.g., M 1 may be proposed first and M 2 second even though M 2 may be better for consumers than M 1 .
Disjoint Mergers
Perhaps the most important limitation of our model is that mergers are disjoint. This rules out, for example, the possibility that a firm may have to choose between two merger partners, or that a recently merged firm might consider merging with another still-independent firm. While disjointness of possible mergers would hold when firms have natural merger partners (as we noted earlier), and has been assumed throughout the small existing literature on antitrust review of mergers in dynamic settings (Nilssen and Sorgard [1998] , Matsushima [2001] , Motta and Vasconcelos [2005] ), it is clearly a strong assumption.
Nondisjoint mergers can cause problems for myopic policies. A first problem is that myopic approval of a CS-increasing merger today may preclude the possibility of approving an even better merger tomorrow. For example, suppose that there are two possible mergers, M 1 and M 2 , with M 1 becoming feasible first. Suppose also that both mergers are CS-increasing in isolation and that firm i is involved in both mergers, M 1 ∩ M 2 = {i}, implying that at most one of the two mergers can be implemented. A myopic policy would thus lead to approval of M 1 if proposed first even though M 2 may be better for consumers.
A second problem relates to firms' proposal incentives. With disjoint mergers, we saw that firms' proposal incentives were aligned with the desires of the antitrust authority because any CS-nondecreasing merger was profitable. When firms must choose among merger partners, however, they may propose the wrong merger from the antitrust authority's perspective (e.g., the most profitable merger may not be the one that maximizes consumer surplus), an issue first pointed out in a static context by Lyons [2002] and more formally studied by Armstrong and Vickers [2010] and Nocke and Whinston [2010] . Firms' incentives to merge may also be distorted because of dynamic considerations when mergers are not disjoint. For example, if firms i and j have a feasible CS-increasing merger today, and firms i, j, and k can merge tomorrow, firms i and j may be disadvantaged in their later bargaining with k if they have already merged and so may avoid merging until the full merger is feasible. (Whether this occurs, depends on the specific bargaining process among the firms; see Segal [2003] on bargaining externalities from coalition formation.)
Aggregate Surplus Standard
In our analysis above, we have assumed that the antitrust authority's objective is to maximize discounted expected consumer surplus. Indeed, as pointed out in the Introduction, this is close to being the legal standard in the U.S. and many other countries. Nevertheless, it is interesting to ask whether the antitrust authority can maximize aggregate surplus (AS) by adopting the most lenient myopically AS-maximizing merger policy.
In the homogeneous-goods Bertrand model, the answer is, yes. One can prove that our results on the interactions between mergers in the Bertrand model, Propositions 5 and 6, continue to hold if we replace the consumer surplus criterion by the aggregate surplus criterion. Consequently, under the most lenient myopically AS-maximizing merger policy there is an equilibrium such that the resulting outcome maximizes discounted aggregate surplus for every realized sequence of mergers F.
In the homogeneous-goods Cournot model, however, the complementarity of AS-increasing mergers does not hold in general. To see this, recall that, in the Cournot model, a marginal cost reduction by a highly inefficient firm (one that produces almost no output, and thus has a profit margin approximately equal to zero) necessarily reduces aggregate surplus. In contrast, a cost-reducing merger between the two most efficient firms in a market may increase aggregate surplus. Thus, complementarity can fail when a cost-reducing, AS-increasing merger by other firms in the market transforms these two firms from being the most efficient firms in the market to being the least efficient. In addition, mergers that increase aggregate surplus need not be profitable for the firms involved in them. The papers by Nilssen and Sorgard [1998] and Matsushima [2001] , for example, both focus on Cournot settings with linear demand and constant marginal costs in which there are two possible mergers, each between a pair of firms, and show that a myopic policy need not be optimal for an antitrust authority interested in maximizing aggregate surplus.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the antitrust authority's optimal dynamic merger approval policy in a model with Cournot competition in which merger opportunities arise stochastically over time, firms decide whether or not to propose a feasible merger, and the antitrust authority decides whether or not to approve proposed mergers. We first established that a form of complementarity exists between mergers in this Cournot setting: specifically, the sign of a merger's consumer surplus effect is unchanged if another merger whose consumer surplus effect has the same sign takes place. This result, which is of independent interest, set the stage for our main result, which showed that, in our benchmark model, an antitrust authority who wishes to maximize discounted expected consumer surplus can implement the dynamically optimal solution by adopting a completely myopic policy according to which the antitrust authority approves a merger if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure. In fact, the antitrust authority cannot improve upon the outcome induced by the myopic policy even if it has perfect foresight about potential future mergers.
While our result on dynamic optimality of a myopic merger approval policy is robust in a number of dimensions, we have also seen that it is fragile in some others. Nonetheless, because our model gives rise to such a striking result -the optimality of myopic merger policy -we feel that it is a natural starting point for understanding the issues involved in optimal merger policy in dynamic environments. In our own continuing work (Nocke and Whinston [2010]) we are exploring optimal merger policy when the nondisjointness of mergers is relaxed, so that firms may have several mergers that they can take part in.
One side implication of our model is that it provides a novel theory of merger waves (for example, see Fauli-Oller [2000] ). In contrast to much of the existing literature (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau [2002, 2008] ), our explanation of merger waves does not rely on aggregate shocks. Specifically, because of the complementarity of CS-nondecreasing mergers in our model, the arrival of a CS-increasing merger opportunity for some firms may have a domino effect by turning other feasible but currently CS-decreasing mergers into CS-nondecreasing mergers, and thereby triggering a merger wave. An interesting aspect of this result is the way in which the antitrust authority's CS-maximizing merger policy affects the emergence of merger waves, since complementarity of mergers does not hold in general absent this antitrust review.
In addition, our results have implications not only for horizontal mergers but also for horizontal breakups of companies into smaller firms. As the breakup of (merged) firm M can be thought of as the reverse operation to merger M , the consumer surplus effect of the breakup of firm M is of the opposite sign as that of merger M . In contrast to merger review policy, a myopic breakup policy is, in general, not dynamically optimal. To see this, suppose that merger M 1 is CS-decreasing in isolation while merger M 2 is CS-increasing in isolation but CSdecreasing once merger M 1 has taken place (implying that M 1 continues to be CS-decreasing conditional on M 2 taking place). Starting from the situation where both mergers have taken place, the breakup of each merged firm, M 1 and M 2 , is CS-increasing in isolation. If M 2 is broken up first, then the breakup of M 1 is also CS-increasing as merger M 1 is, by assumption, CS-decreasing in isolation. In contrast, if M 1 is broken up first, then the breakup of M 2 is CS-decreasing as merger M 2 is CS-increasing in isolation. The complementarity result of Proposition 1 therefore does not apply to breakups, and a myopic breakup policy exhibits path dependence: if the breakup of firm M 2 is considered first, both breakups will be implemented, but if the breakup of firm M 1 is considered first, only firm M 1 will be broken up. 28 Merger policy is one of the central pillars of antitrust policy. Our results show that it is possible to make progress analyzing merger review policy in richer models that recognize the dynamic nature of the merger review problem. Our hope is that our results will serve as a starting point for further studies that analyze optimal merger policy when some of the assumptions that lead to the optimality of myopic merger policy, such as the disjointness of mergers and the absence of merger blocking costs, fail to hold. Continuing iteratively identifies a sequencing of the mergers in M\Y that is CS-nondecreasing at each step starting from the subset Y .
(ii) Consider an arbitrary merger M j in sequence M 1 , ..., M J1 . We will show that M j is CSnondecreasing given that all of the mergers in M\M j have taken place. For k ≥ j, define the set
Observe that, by hypothesis, property (a k ) is true for k = j, and that property (b k ) holds for all k. We claim that properties (a k ) and (b k ) imply property (a k+1 ): M j is CS-nondecreasing given M k+1 \M j . To see this, observe that if merger M k+1 is CS-nondecreasing given M k \M j , property (a k+1 ) follows from Proposition 1(i), while if merger M k+1 is CS-decreasing given M k \M j then property (a k+1 ) follows from Proposition 2(i) [and the fact that M k+1 is CS-nondecreasing given M k ]. Applying induction we find that merger M j is CS-nondecreasing given that all of the mergers in M\M j have taken place [property (a J1 )]. Part (ii) of Lemma 6 implies that the set of mergers resulting from a merger policy in which the antitrust authority considers mergers within period t in a step-by-step fashion, approving mergers that are CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure until no further CSnondecreasing mergers can be identified, possesses the property that every merger in the set is CS-nondecreasing given every other merger in the set. This is also a property possessed by any myopically CS-maximizing set (if any approved merger M were CS-decreasing given the other approved mergers, then consumer surplus could be increased by not approving merger M while continuing to approve the others). The next lemma establishes two features of sets possessing this property. [since by hypothesis merger M 2,k+1 is also CS-nondecreasing given that all of the mergers in
1 is also CS-nondecreasing given that all of the mergers } satisfy the hypotheses of the Lemma. So we can apply the argument again for these two sets. Continuing iteratively in this fashion we establish the result by adding to M 2 a sequencing of the mergers in M 1 \(M 1 ∩ M 2 ) that is CS-nondecreasing at each step. This establishes that the level of consumer surplus is at least as high with set M 1 ∪ M 2 as with set M 2 . We also need to show that the level of consumer surplus in M 1 ∪ M 2 is at least as large as in set
, then we can repeat the argument above with the roles of M 1 and M 2 reversed to establish the result.
We now use these results to prove Lemmas 2 and 3. Proof of Lemma 2. Given proposed mergers P t and market structure A t−1 , let A 0 be a largest myopically CS-maximizing set and let A 6 = A 0 be a myopically CS-maximizing set. We will show that A ⊂ A 0 . Suppose otherwise, so that A 0 ⊂ (A ∪ A 0 ). The sets A and A 0 satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 7. So, by Lemma 7(ii), A ∪ A 0 is myopically CS-maximizing as well, contradicting the assumption that A 0 is a largest myopically CS-maximizing set for P t given market structure A t−1 . Hence, A 0 must contain every other myopically CS-maximizing set, which also implies that A 0 is the unique largest CS-maximizing set.
For the second claim, suppose A * (P t |A t−1 )* A * (P 0 t |A t−1 ). The sets A * (P t |A t−1 ) and A * (P 0 t |A t−1 ) satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 7 and, since A * (P t |A t−1 ) ⊆ P t ∪ A t−1 ⊂ P 0 t ∪ A t−1 , all mergers in set A * (P t |A t−1 ) are feasible when the set of proposed mergers is P 0 t . Thus, when the set of proposed mergers is P 0 t , approval of the mergers in set A * (P t |A t−1 ) ∪ A * (P 0 t |A t−1 ) is feasible and by Lemma 7(ii) is also myopically CS-maximizing, contradicting A * (P 0 t |A t−1 ) being the largest myopically CS-maximizing set for P 0 t given market structure A t−1 . Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that the set of proposed mergers is P t and the market structure prior to period t is A t−1 . Let A⊆P t denote a set of mergers resulting from a merger policy in which the antitrust authority considers mergers within period t in a step-by-step fashion, approving mergers that are CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure until no further CS-nondecreasing mergers can be identified. By part (ii) of Lemma 6 (the Incremental Gain Lemma), every merger in A must be CS-nondecreasing given every other merger in the set. If A * A * (P t |A t−1 ), then Lemma 7(ii) implies that the set A ∪ A * (P t |A t−1 ) is also myopically CS-maximizing but strictly contains set A * (P t |A t−1 ), a contradiction to A * (P t |A t−1 ) being the largest myopically CS-maximizing set for P t given market structure A t−1 . Hence, A ⊆ A * (P t |A t−1 ). If A ⊂ A * (P t |A t−1 ), Lemma 7(i) implies that once the mergers in A have been approved, there is a merger in A * (P t |A t−1 )\(A∩A * (P t |A t−1 )) = A * (P t |A t−1 )\A that is CSnondecreasing given that the mergers in A have taken place, contradicting A being the result of a step-by-step merger policy that approves mergers that are CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure until no further CS-nondecreasing mergers can be identified. Proof of Proposition 4. To consider extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria we perturb the game by introducing a minimum and a maximum probability of a merger proposal at any information set of a proposer of a feasible but not-yet-approved merger. We examine Nash equilibrium behavior in the agent normal form as these minimum and maximum probabilities approach zero and one, respectively. (i) We will first establish that all feasible mergers being proposed in each period after any history is an extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium for the firms. Combined with Lemma 3, this yields part (i) of the proposition. To do so, it suffices to examine perturbed games in which at every information set of a proposer of a feasible but not-yet-approved merger the merger must be proposed with a probability of at least ε > 0 and not more than 1 − ε, where ε → 0.
The proof is by induction and follows closely that of Proposition 3. Consider, a period t in which the history prior to period t's proposal stage consists of the sequences F t = (F 1 , ..., F t )
of feasible mergers, P t−1 = (P 1 , ..., P t−1 ) of proposed mergers, and A t−1 = (A 1 , ..., A t−1 ) of approved mergers. Note that this history also determines exactly each firm i's observed history, which we denote by I t i . Formally, each I t i corresponds to an information set for firm i at the proposal stage in period t. The most important difference to the proof of Proposition 3 is that the induction hypothesis is now that for any period t < T , starting in period t + 1 all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers will be proposed in every period with the maximum possible probability 1 − ε.
To show that proposing its merger with the maximum possible probability is optimal in period t for every proposer firm with a feasible but-not-yet approved merger, consider proposer firm i at an information set I t i with a feasible but not-yet-approved merger M k . Recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that, for a given information set I t i and a given set of other proposed mergers b P −k , either the merger M k is not approved when proposed (and so proposing the merger has no effect on current profits), or the merger is approved when proposed but the merged firm is inactive (and so, again, proposing the merger has no effect on current profits), or the merger is approved and results in an active firm (in which case there is a strictly positive effect on current profits). In the first case (i.e., the merger is not approved when proposed), there is also no effect on future profits of proposing the merger given the induction hypothesis. The same is true in the second case (when the merger is approved but results in an inactive firm). In the third case (where the merger is approved and results in an active firm), however, there might be an effect on future profits if t < T . But this effect is continuous in the size of the tremble ε, and (as is clear from the proof of Proposition 3) is equal to zero if ε = 0. Since there are at most a finite number of such information sets I t i and sets b P −k , there exists an ε t > 0 such that for all ε ≤ ε t , proposing a feasible and not-yet-approved merger that ends up being approved and results in an active firm in period t is strictly profitable. Hence, for ε ≤ ε t , proposing every feasible and not-yet-approved merger in period t is profitable. The same is clearly true if t = T , where there is no effect on future profits.
We conclude that our induction hypothesis -that all feasible and not-yet approved mergers will be proposed in the future with the maximum possible probability -holds when we look at period t − 1 provided that ε ≤ ε t = min τ ≥t ε τ . Applying induction starting in period T implies that proposing every feasible but not-yet-approved merger in every period with the maximum possible probability is a Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form of any perturbed game with ε ≤ ε 1 . Hence, taking ε → 0, proposal of every feasible but not-yet-approved merger in every period is an extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium.
(ii) We next show that every extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium maximizes discounted consumer surplus (and results in the same sequence of period-by-period consumer surpluses) for each sequence of feasible mergers F. To establish this result, we restrict attention to small perturbations in which the minimum probability of a merger proposal at any information set for a proposer of a feasible but not-yet-approved merger is no more than ε 1 > 0 (where ε 1 is defined as above) and the maximum probability is no less than 1 − ε 1 . We examine Nash equilibrium behavior in the agent normal form as the minimum and maximum probabilities approach zero and one, respectively.
We now show that if the perturbations are strictly positive but sufficiently small (in the sense defined above), then if the true set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers in period t is F t \A t−1 , every merger in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 will be proposed with the maximum possible probability in that period. [Recall that the set A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ), defined in the proof of Proposition 3(ii), is the set of mergers in A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) that result in active firms given the market structure A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ).] The result follows as we let the minimum and maximum proposal probabilities go to zero and one, respectively. The proof is by induction. The induction hypothesis for period t is that in all future periods τ > t, whenever the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers is F τ \A τ −1 , then all mergers in A * 1 (F τ \A τ −1 |A τ −1 )\A τ −1 are proposed with the maximum possible probability.
Suppose that F t \A t−1 is indeed the true set of feasible and not-yet-approved mergers. Let I t (F t \A t−1 ) denote those information sets in period t that are consistent with F t \A t−1 ; that is, these are the information sets that are reached for at least one sequence (F t , P t−1 ) of feasible mergers and merger proposals that, given the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, results in the set of feasible but not-yet-proposed mergers in period t being F t \A t−1 . Consider any information set I t i ∈ I t (F t \A t−1 ) that belongs to the proposer of a merger M k ∈ (F t \A t−1 ) such that M k ∈ A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 . From our earlier argument, if all minimum proposal probabilities are no greater than ε 1 and all maximum proposal probabilities are no less than 1−ε 1 , proposing merger M k never reduces the expected joint discounted profits of the firms in M k . We now show that proposing merger M k is in fact strictly profitable in expectation.
Observe, first, that in any Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form of the perturbed game, the information set I t i is reached with positive probability along the equilibrium path when the set of feasible but not-yet-proposed mergers in period t is F t \A t−1 , so (in belief language) the agent choosing at this information set must assign a strictly positive probability to F t \A t−1 being the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers.
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The rest of the argument follows closely, with some differences, the proof of Proposition 3(ii): Starting from A t−1 , there is an ordering of the mergers in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 that is CS-nondecreasing at each step, which we denote by (M 1 , ..., M S ). As in the proof of Proposition 3(ii), consider the proposal of merger M k at I t i and suppose that all mergers M s for s < k are proposed with maximum probability when F t \A t−1 is the true set of feasible and not-yet-approved mergers in period t. (Note that this assumption is valid when k = 1.) Now, given the trembles, the proposer of M k at I t i must assign a strictly positive probability to the event that the realized set of proposed mergers is b P t = {M 1 , ..., M k }. As in the proof of Proposition 3(ii), in this case all of these mergers will be approved and will result in active firms. Hence, the proposer of M k at I t i must believe that, if proposed, merger M k will be approved and result in an active firm with strictly positive probability. But from our previous argument, if merger M k is approved and the merged firm M k is active, proposal of the merger is strictly profitable when the perturbations are small (in the sense described above). Applying induction starting at k = 1, we see that any such merger M k will be proposed in period t with the maximum possible probability. Thus, if F t \A t−1 is the true set of feasible and not-yetapproved mergers, all mergers in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 will be proposed with the maximum possible probability.
Applying induction, we conclude that in any perturbed game if the true set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers in period t is F t \A t−1 , then every merger in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 will be proposed with the maximum possible probability in that period. Taking the perturbations to zero yields the result. Proof of Lemma 5. To see Property 1, note that, in equilibrium, only a uniquely lowest-cost firm (a firm that is the only one to have cost c ι(1|N ) ) can make a positive profit before the merger. Hence, Property 1 can fail to hold only if the merger involves a firm that is the unique 29 This property -that any firm with a merger in Ft\A t−1 must always assign a strictly positive probability to Ft\A t−1 being the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers -is a key step of the argument. It would not be true without the perturbations and is the reason why perturbations are needed for ensuring the proposal of all mergers in A * 1 (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 .
Sketch of Arguments Underlying Remark 2
In the following, we briefly sketch the arguments leading to our claim in Remark 2. To do so, we need to extend many of the results in the text. To refer to these additional results, we will append a prime to the number of the result it extends. For example, the result that extends Proposition 2 will be denoted Proposition 2'.
CS Effects of and Interactions Between Mergers
Mirroring the statement of Proposition 1, Proposition 1' states: (i) If a merger M 1 is CSincreasing (and hence profitable) in isolation, it remains CS-increasing (and hence profitable) if another merger M 2 that is CS-nondecreasing in isolation takes place and the merged firm M 1 remains active after merger M 2 has taken place. (ii) If a merger M 1 is CS-nonincreasing in isolation and results in an active firm, then the merger remains CS-nonincreasing if another merger M 2 that is CS-nonincreasing in isolation takes place. The proof of part (i) of the proposition uses the fact for M 1 to be CS-increasing after merger M 2 takes place, the merged firm M 1 must also be active if merger M 2 does not take place, and follows a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 1(i). The proof of part (ii) of the proposition uses the fact that if the merged firm M 1 is active in isolation, it must remain active after merger M 2 has taken place since the CS-nondecreasing merger M 2 weakly increases the equilibrium price; moreover, the CS-nondecreasing merger M 2 weakly decreases the threshold value of postmerger marginal cost, b c M1 , that makes merger M 1 just CS-neutral, and so merger M 1 must remain CS-nondecreasing if M 2 takes place.
In Proposition 2', the hypothesis is that merger M 1 is CS-increasing [rather than CSnondecreasing, as in Proposition 2] in isolation, while merger M 2 is CS-nonincreasing [rather than CS-decreasing] in isolation but CS-increasing once merger M 1 has taken place. Under this modified hypothesis, the statements of parts (i) and (ii) remain unchanged. The proof of the proposition proceeds along the same lines as that of Proposition 2, except for some small modifications. For instance, in the second sentence of the proof of part (i) "weakly increases" is replaced by "strictly increases" and "nonnegative" by "strictly positive." Lemma 6' (the modified Incremental Gain Lemma) differs from Lemma 6 in that "CSnondecreasing" is replaced everywhere by "CS-increasing." For instance, the set M in part (i) has the property that every merger M ∈ M is CS-increasing if all of the other mergers in M have taken place. As a result, starting from any strict subset Y ⊂ M, there exists a sequencing of the mergers in M\Y that is CS-increasing at each step. The proof uses the fact that, under the hypothesis of the lemma, every merger M ∈ M must result in an active firm, for any set A ⊆ M of approved mergers. 30 This means that we can apply part (i) of Proposition 1'
and use the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 6 (but with "CS-decreasing" being replaced by "CS-nonincreasing", and so on). As for part (ii) of Lemma 6', we need to add the assumption that every merger in the sequence remains active when all of the other mergers in the sequence have taken place. That is, the statement now reads: Suppose that a sequence of mergers M 1 , ..., M J1 is CS-increasing at each step. Then each merger M ∈ M ≡ {M 1 , ..., M J1 } is CS-increasing if all of the other mergers in M (those in the set M\M ) have taken place, provided that each merged firm M remains active after the mergers in M\M . To obtain Lemma 7' from Lemma 7, the hypothesis is modified so that the set M 1 has the property that every merger in the set is CS-increasing if all of the other mergers in that set have taken place, while the set M 2 continues to have the property that every merger in the set is CS-nondecreasing if all of the other mergers in that set have taken place. Lemma 7' states that if M 1 * M 2 and if each of the mergers in set M 1 \(M 1 ∩ M 2 ) (when done on its own) results in an active firm once all of the mergers in set M 2 have taken place, then there exists a merger M would be a merger among active firms once the mergers in M 2 have taken place, then an induction argument along the same lines as that in the proof of part (i) of Lemma 7 (now using Proposition 1') establishes the result. Note that a sufficient condition for each of the mergers in set M 1 \(M 1 ∩ M 2 ) to result in an active firm once all of the mergers in set M 2 have taken place is that consumer surplus under set M 1 is at least as large as under set M 2 ; that is, letting p * i denote the equilibrium price after all of the mergers in set M i , i = 1, 2, have taken place, if we have p * 2 ≥ p * 1 . To see this, note that every merged firm M ∈ M 1 must have a cost c M < p * 1 since, otherwise, the merger would not be CS-increasing given the other mergers in set M 1 . But then c M < p * 2 , which implies that merger M results in an active firm once all of the mergers in set M 2 have taken place. [A counterpart to Lemma 7(ii) is not necessary for our purposes here.]
Myopically CS-maximizing Sets
In analog to the largest myopically CS-maximizing set, we can define a smallest myopically CS-maximizing set for the set of proposed mergers P t given current market structure A t−1 , as a myopically CS-maximizing set that does not contain any other myopically CS-maximizing set.
Lemma 2' makes the same uniqueness claim as Lemma 2, but for the smallest myopically CS-maximizing set rather than for A * (P t |A t−1 ): there is a unique smallest myopically CSmaximizing set, denoted A * (P t |A t−1 ). (In contrast to Lemma 2, no monotonicity claim is made.) The proof of the uniqueness property is by contradiction. Suppose there are two smallest myopically CS-maximizing sets, say A and A 0 , with A 6 = A 0 . Without loss of generality, suppose that A * A 0 . Since each one of the sets must have the property that every merger in the set is CS-increasing given the other mergers in that set and since the two sets must induce the same level of consumer surplus, we can apply Lemma 7' to show that there exists a merger M 0 ∈ A\(A ∩ A 0 ) that is CS-increasing given that all of the mergers in A 0 have taken place.
But then A 0 cannot be a myopically CS-maximizing set, a contradiction.
The following result shows that the smallest myopically CS-maximizing set is contained in any other myopically CS-maximizing set, and that any myopically CS-maximizing set is contained in the largest myopically CS-maximizing set: must be a subset of the solution set of the less constrained problem of myopically maximizing consumer surplus given that the set of proposed mergers is F t and no mergers have previously been approved.
Applying Lemma 9 iteratively, we see that if all feasible mergers are proposed in period t, then regardless of firms' previous behavior the market structure in period t will contain the set A * (F t |∅) and be contained within the set A * (F t |∅), which implies that it is a solution to the problem of maximizing consumer surplus in period t given that no mergers have previously been approved. This implies that Lemma 4' holds. Note also that if in period t all mergers in A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 are proposed when F t \A t−1 is the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers, then regardless of previous behavior by the firms the market structure in period t will again contain the set A * (F t |∅) and be contained within the set A * (F t |∅). To see this, observe that if P t is such that A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A Thus, if in all periods all mergers in A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) are proposed when F t \A t−1 is the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers, then the outcome will yield optimal period-by-period levels of consumer surplus. These facts imply that dynamic optimality holds for any myopically CS-maximizing policy:
Proposition 3' If the antitrust authority follows a myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, then for each sequence F, every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in the same optimal sequence of period-by-period consumer surpluses.
Proof. (Sketch)
The proof follows very closely that of part (ii) of Proposition 3. It proceeds by establishing, using an induction argument, that whenever F t \A t−1 is the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers in period t, all mergers in set A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) will necessarily be proposed, which establishes the claim (using the argument above). One important change relative to the case of the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is that, in any period t, future market structures may be affected by whether a given merger M k ∈ A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 is proposed today. However, these future market structure effects can involve merger M k only if the merged firm would be inactive and can involve mergers other than M k only in situations in which those mergers are CS-neutral given the other mergers being approved. They therefore have no effect on the joint profits of the firms in merger M k , so we can again focus solely on current period profit effects. Consider the proposal of a merger M k ∈ A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 in period t under the assumption that future payoffs for the firms involved in that merger are independent of period t behavior. Since A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) is the smallest myopically CS-maximizing set for F t \A t−1 32 The argument in footnote 15 implies that the consumer surplus levels with approved mergers A * (Ft\A t−1 |A t−1 ) and A * (P t |A t−1 ) must be the same. Since each of these two sets has the property that every merger in the set is CS-increasing given the other mergers in the set, we can apply Lemma 7' to show that the two sets must be the same.
given A t−1 , every merger in A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 is CS-increasing given every other merger in that set and results in an active firm. Part (i) of Lemma 6' implies that there is an ordering of the mergers in A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1 that is CS-increasing at each step, which we denote by (M 1 , ..., M S ). Suppose that all mergers M s for s < k are proposed when F t \A t−1 is the set of feasible and not-yet-approved mergers in period t (which is true when k = 1.) Consider the case where b P t = {M 1 , ..., M k }. We claim that all of the mergers in {M 1 , ..., M k } will be approved. To see this, note first that all of the merged firms in {M 1 , ..., M k } will be active if all are approved [since the price will be no less than if all of the mergers {M 1 , ..., M S } = A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 )\A t−1
are approved]. Hence, by part (ii) of Lemma 6', every merger in b P t is CS-increasing given the other mergers in that set (and given the previously approved mergers A t−1 ). If the antitrust authority were to approve only a (possibly empty) subset of b P t , part (i) of Lemma 6' implies that the antitrust authority could strictly increase consumer surplus by approving the other mergers in b P t as well. This proves the claim that all of the mergers in {M 1 , ..., M k } will be approved when b P t = {M 1 , ..., M k }. Consider now the case where {M 1 , ..., M k } ⊂ b P t . Using the same argument as above, the set {M 1 , ..., M k } has the property that every merger in the set is CS-increasing given the other mergers in that set, and so [by part (i) of Lemma 6'] for any strict subset Y ⊂ {M 1 , ..., M k }, there exists a merger M 0 ∈ {M 1 , ..., M k }\Y that is CS-increasing given Y . We claim that {M 1 , ..., M k } ⊆ A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ) in any myopically CS-maximizing policy, so that all of the mergers in {M 1 , ..., M k } will be approved. To see this, suppose otherwise that {M 1 , ..., M k } * A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ). Note first that every merger in A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ) is CS-nondecreasing given the other mergers in that set. Since b P t ⊆ F t \A t−1 , the equilibrium price under market structure A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ) must be weakly higher than under market structure A * t (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ), and the equilibrium price under market structure A * t (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) must be the same as under market structure A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) (by virtue of both sets being CS-maximizing given the same set of proposed mergers and given the same market structure). Since all of the merged firms in {M 1 , ..., M k } are active when market structure is A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ), this implies that these firms will also be active when the market structure is A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ). Let Y = A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ) ∩ {M 1 , ..., M k }. Since all of the merged firms in {M 1 , ..., M k } are active when market structure is A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ), Lemma 7' implies that there exists a merger M 0 ∈ {M 1 , ..., M k }\Y that is CS-increasing given all of the mergers in A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ). But this means that the antitrust authority can strictly increase consumer surplus by approving merger M 0 in addition to all of the mergers in A * t ( b P t |A t−1 )\A t−1 , a contradiction to A * t ( b P t |A t−1 ) being myopically CS-maximizing. This proves the claim that all of the mergers in {M 1 , ..., M k } will be approved when {M 1 , ..., M k } ⊂ b P t . Hence, using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3, proposal of merger M k is strictly profitable. Applying induction starting at k = 1, it follows that all mergers in A * (F t \A t−1 |A t−1 ) will be proposed.
